A surprising feature of resource-rich economies is slow growth. It is often argued that natural-resource production impedes development by creating market or institutional failures. This paper establishes an alternative explanationa slow-growing resource sector. A declining resource sector is disproportionately reected in resource-dependent countries. Additionally, there is little evidence that resource dependence impedes growth in non-resource sectors. More generally, this paper illustrates the importance of considering industry composition in cross-country growth regressions. 
Introduction
Poor countries are relatively resource dependent (Barbier, 2005) . Understanding the relationship between resource wealth and growth is therefore a necessary step towards understanding the growth performance of poor countries. Surprisingly, a large literature documents a negative relationship between resource dependence and economic growth. This remarkably robust phenomenon is commonly attributed to the so-called resource curse the systematic tendency for resource dependence to impede economic growth and development by creating market or institutional failures (Sachs and Warner 1995 , 1999 Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; James and Aadland, 2010) . According to this theory, developing countries like Brunei are poor not in spite of resource endowments but rather, because of resource endowments.
With nearly 3000 citations, this literature is largely motivated by the seminal work of Jeffery Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) who, using a cross section of international data estimate a negative conditional relationship between growth and resource dependence. Specically, Sachs and Warner estimate a variation of the following equation
where G i is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita from [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , r i is resource dependence (exports of fuels, minerals, metals and agriculture in GDP) at the beginning of the period (1971) , and i denotes countries. 1 Sachs and Warner conclude that the coecient on resource dependence, b 1 , is negative and signicant, and consider this to be evidence of a resource curse. While others have similarly tested for a resource curse (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; Williams, 2010; James and Aadland, 2010) , this methodology has since been heavily criticized.
Perhaps most notably, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) question whether a negative correlation between resource dependence and growth implies an underlying story of causation.
More specically, they argue that such cross-sectional regressions suer from problems of reverse causality. Because resource dependence is dened as resource earnings relative to income, poorer countries that may grow relatively slowly will tend to be more resource dependent than their wealthier, perhaps faster growing counterparts. Using a cross-section of data, they instrument for resource dependence and nd a positive and signicant relationship between resource abundance and growth and an insignicant relationship between resource dependence and growth. 2 This paper abstracts from questions of causality and asks an even more fundamental question regarding the interpretation of b 1 from equation (1). Because growth is a weighted average of growth in individual sectors, a declining international resource price is disproportionately reected in the growth rates of resource-dependent countries. While GDP growth is correlated with resource dependence (negatively so during periods of falling resource prices and positively so during periods of rising resource prices) there is little robust evidence that sector-specic growth is correlated with resource dependence. There is little evidence of a Dutch Disease. To the contrary, a booming resource sector appears to generate economic spillovers that positively aect growth in non-resource sectors in highly resource-dependent countries.
Existing Explanations for the Resource Curse
Why do resource-rich economies grow slowly? A prominent explanation is the so-called Dutch Disease phenomenon. Named after the decline in the tradable sector that is said to have been caused by the discovery of natural gas in the Netherlands (Stijns, 2005) , an economy suers from a Dutch Disease when natural-resource industries crowd out other growthpromoting industries such as manufacturing (Matsuyama, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1999) . In Matsuyama's model, an increase in resource technology in a small and open economy pulls labor out of a non-resource industry that benets from learning-by-doing and into a resource industry that does not. A resource discovery decreases the level of technology in the nonresource industry and decreases total economic growth. The equilibrium is inecient because the positive externality associated with working in the non-resource industry is not internalized by labor. The Dutch Disease is similarly modeled by van Wijnbergen (1984) , Krugman (1987) and Sachs and Warner (1999) . Auty (1994) argues that resource endowments can prolong anti-growth policies. For example, countries that are resource dependent may be more likely to favor autarkic trade policies.
One reason for this may be that the presence of natural resources (think agriculture and energy) make autarky a more viable trade policy.
Similarly, some economists and political scientists have argued that natural-resource endowments create the opportunity for rent-seeking, whereby rent-seeking and productive enter-2 van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) argue that the measure of resource abundance used by Brunnschweiler and Bulte is endogenous. Using what they argue to be a more exogenous measure of resource abundance they nd no signicant eect on growth of resource dependence or abundance.
prise are competing endeavors (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Torvik, 2002; Mehlum et al., 2006) . In Torvik's model, the potential gains from unproductive rent-seeking activities are increasing in total tax revenue and a resource endowment. An exogenous increase in the resource endowment causes some entrepreneurs to switch from producing a good in an industry that benets from increasing returns to scale to participating in unproductive rent-seeking activities. Production and therefore consumption decrease as a result of an increase in the resource endowment. Rent-seeking has also been shown to lead to distortions in the allocation of resources, greater social inequality and political corruption (Ross, 1999; Sala-i-martin and Subramanian, 2004) .
Natural-resource production can also lead to social conict, as factions of society compete over control of natural resources (Collier and Hoeer, 1998). 3 Collier and Hoeer nd that the eect of natural-resource abundance on civil war is non-monotonic. Increasing resource abundance when resource abundance is low increases the risk of civil war. When resource abundance is high, increasing resource abundance tends to decrease the risk of civil war.
Collier and Hoeer posit that small endowments of natural resources provide taxable revenue that rebels wish to take control of while large endowments of natural resources provide a government with the means to heavily invest in their military. Gylfason (2001) argues that vast endowments of natural resources can lead to over-condence and a false sense of economic security, which leads to under-investments in human capital.
Gylfason documents a direct negative eect of resource dependence on growth and a negative indirect eect of resource dependence on growth, through its eect on school enrollment rates.
As Gylfason puts it, Rich parents sometimes spoil their kids. Mother Nature is no exception.
See van der Ploeg (2011) for a more complete review of existing theoretical explanations of a resource curse.
Present in each of the theories above is a mechanism by which natural-resource production actively impedes the development process in non-resource industries. This is a necessary assumption for a resource curse to exist. Less this assumption, an economy would not be worse o after a resource is discovered and extracted. The alternative theory presented in this paper, namely that the slow growth of resource-dependent economies reects the slow growth of resource industries, is not entirely new. Boyce and Emery (2011) raise the same concern and argue that whether resources are a curse or a blessing for an economy can only be determined with an investigation of the correlation between resource abundance and income levels. 4 Alexeev and Conrad (2009) similarly argue that a proper test of a resource curse includes exploring the data, they subsequently test for a resource curse by regressing the level of income per person on the share of employment in a natural-resource industry. They nd some evidence of a positive relationship between resource abundance and income levels. Davis (2011) refers to this phenomenon, whereby a slow-growing resource industry slows the growth rate of the entire economy, as a resource drag. A straightforward test of this theory involves regressing growth on resource dependence while controlling for growth in resource production. Davis applies this methodology to the growth period 1971 to 1990 and nds evidence that a so-called resource drag explains a signicant amount of the negative relationship between growth and resource dependence. Specically, he nds that even after controlling for resource drag eects there are some residual nefarious impacts of having high mineral production at the start of the growth period. The economic importance of the eect is, however, about half of what was estimated [prior to controlling for resource sector growth].
In the empirical section of this paper I will employ Davis's methodology as a robustness check on a series of baseline results.
Using methodology similar to that outlined in this paper, James and James (2011) test for a resource curse at the sub-national level. Applying their methodology to the international level is important for a couple of reasons. First, a large majority of empirical tests for the resource curse focus on the relationship between growth and resource dependence across countries.
Second, there are reasons to believe the resource curse is more prominent among countries.
For example, institutional quality and cultural customs vary across countries, but less so across U.S. states. This is important because such factors play crucial roles in some explanations of the resource curse. For example, Mehlum et al. (2006) among others have argued that poor institutional quality can lead to, or exacerbate a resource curse. Finally, while James and James consider the growth period 1980 to 2000, this paper judiciously examines the relationship between growth and resource dependence for a variety of growth periods using a range of regression specications.
3 Deriving The Coecient On Resource Dependence Similar to James and James (2011) , consider economy i that produces a non-natural-resource good, M i , and a natural-resource good, R i . Income and growth are respectively given by
relationship between resource wealth and income levels. and
where g M i and g R i are the growth rates of non-resource and resource output per capita. Noting
and making the appropriate substitution, equation (3) can be re-written as
, is resource dependence. In the absence of a resource curse, dierentiating (4) with respect to resource dependence yields (g
, implying that the estimate of b 1 from equation (1) is equal to the dierence in average resource and non-resource sector growth
rates. This result is not robust to a resource curse though. To see this, assume that the growth rate of the non-resource sector is negatively aected by resource dependence. Specically, let
Dierentiating (4) with respect to resource dependence now
, where the rst term is negative. This implies that if nonresource sector growth is cursed by resource dependence, an OLS estimation of equation (1) will yield a coecient on resource dependence that is less than the dierence in average sector growth rates. This also implies that whether the relationship between resource dependence and growth is negative or positive, critically depends on the rates at which the resource and non-resource sectors grow during the sample period.
4 Empirical Estimation
Estimation of Equation 1
According to equation (4), in the absence of a resource curse, whether the coecient on resource dependence (b 1 from equation (1)) is positive or negative depends on the relative average rates at which the non-resource and resource sectors grow (a large amount of which turns out to be explained by variation in the resource price). For a given growth period, if the average resource sector grew relatively slowly, the relationship between resource dependence and growth will tend to be negative. The opposite will be true for periods in which the average resource sector grew relatively quickly. This section conrms this idea by estimating equation
(1) for a variety of growth periodsones for which the price of the resource grew rapidly and ones for which it grew slowly.
Cross-country data on GDP and population were collected from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. The extant resource curse literature suggests that point-resources and fuels in particularmay be especially conducive to a resource curse (see for example, Ross, 2001; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Bulte et al., 2005) . Following this literature, resource dependence is dened as the value of crude oil and natural gas production relative to GDP. Data on oil and natural gas production was collected from Ross (2013) .
This allows
for the examination of many and some relatively long growth periods, e.g., 40 years (1970 to 2010).
6
The World Bank provides GDP and population estimates for 190 countries spanning the years 1970 to 2010. Ross (2013) gives data on oil and natural gas production over the same time period. I use values of oil and gas production that reect real prices based in 2000 U.S.
dollars which are provided. Dropping countries that did not have any GDP values for any of the relevant years (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010) and matching this data with the oil and gas production data leaves 111 observations. The growth rates of income, resource and non-resource production are respectively dened as,
where T is the length of the growth period, Y i is GDP per capita, R i is the value of resource production per capita and M i is the value of non-resource production per capita. All prices are in 2000 U.S. dollars. Countries that had zero resource earnings at either time t or time t + T but not both, were dropped from the oil and gas data set prior to being merged with the World Bank data as resource (and hence non-resource) growth rates cannot be computed. A list of all countries included in the analysis is given in Table 1 . As can be seen, the data set consists of both rich and poor countries covering a wide range of regions. Recall from equation (4) that, in the absence of a resource curse, the coecient on resource dependence reects the dierence in the average resource and non-resource sector growth rates,
8 If a resource curse exists though, the dierence in average sector growth rates 7 Price index data were collected from the World Bank, Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities database and is available at: data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/commodity-price-data.
8 Average growth rates of resource and non-resource production are respectively given byḡ
, where r i is resource dependence (and hence (1 − r i ) is non-resource dependence) and k denotes countries. Weighting growth rates by resource and non-resource dependence is important as even large changes in non-resource production is not reected by changes in GDP in highly resource-dependent is greater than the estimate of b 1 from equation (1). It is therefore worth noting that for each growth period the dierence between b 1 and (ḡ R −ḡ M ) is statistically insignicant. Put dierently, average sector growth heterogeneity (that is not country specic) explains a significant amount of the variation in b 1 and the remaining unexplained variation is insignicantly dierent from zero. The correlation between the estimate of b 1 and (ḡ R −ḡ M ) is large (.98), implying that 98% of the variation in b 1 is explained by average sector-growth heterogeneity that is not country specic.
Resource Dependence and Sector-Specic Growth
The previous results demonstrate that whether resource-dependent countries grow relatively quickly or slowly depends critically on whether a country's resource sector grows quickly or slowly over the corresponding growth period. This is not to say that the growth rates of resource and non-resource sectors are uncorrelated. During a signicant oil price bust (e.g.,
1980 to 1990) non-resource production may grow more or less quickly than in other periods.
According to the Core Dutch Disease Model by Corden and Neary (1982) , a booming (or busting) resource sector can aect non-resource production in a variety of ways. For example, in the case of a resource boom, the resource sector may oer relatively high wages and hence attract labor from non-resource sectors (or even other economies). This may work to decrease non-resource production, a result Corden and Neary refer to as the direct labor movement eect. However, the income gains associated with a resource boom may increase spending and wages in the non-tradedand often non-resource (e.g., service)sectors, which may attract labor and counteract the direct so-called labor movement eect.
While there are reasons to think that resource and non-resource sector growth rates may be correlated, this is not to say that the correlation should depend on the corresponding degree of resource dependence. I further test for the existence of a resource curse by splitting each country's economy into two parts: a resource sector and a non-resource sector. I then re-estimate equation (1) using sector-specic growth as the dependent variable. This approach explicitly tests whether sector-specic growth is correlated with resource dependence for all, or some, growth periods. Before turning to these results, however, it should be noted that total economic growth may only weakly reect sector-specic growth rates. For example, a country that is 90% resource dependent may experience rapid growth in non-resource production, but this would not necessarily be reected in total growth as non-resource production accounts for only 10% of national income. Second, recall that average sector growth rates countries. By design then, the average non-resource sector growth rate is predominantly determined by the performance of non-resource-dependent countries.
are weighted averages such that a country with zero resource earnings and zero growth in resource production did not contribute to the estimate of the international average growth rate of resource production. Only those countries with positive levels of resource production (and hence those countries with non-zero growth rates of resource production) are used to estimate the relationship between resource dependence and growth in resource production.
This signicantly reduces the sample size.
The results for all ten growth periods are given in Table 3 . For comparison purposes, I
have also included scatter plots of sector-specic growth rates against resource dependence for both the 1970-1980 and 1980-1990 Consider now the relationship between sector growth and resource dependence for the growth period 1980-1990 (a period during which the price of oil signicantly decreased). While non-resource sector growth is insignicantly correlated with resource dependence (the coecient is small in magnitude and negative but lacks statistical signicance), the relationship between resource dependence and resource-sector growth is negative (-.085) and signicant at the 5% level. Again though, this result is sensitive to the omission of outliers. Dropping the three most resource-dependent countries from the data set (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Brunei), the magnitude of the relationship decreases to -.046 and becomes statistically insignicant.
One may consider this evidence that resource-sectors perform poorly in resource-dependent countries when the price of the resource falls. But this potential eect is fundamentally different from a resource curse. Rather, a resource curse exists when the production of a natural resource today, leads to lower levels of income in the future. For this to happen, the production of a natural resource must impede growth in the corresponding non-resource sector.
Briey examining the growth performance of Gabon is revealing in this context. In 1980,
Gabon was 60% resource dependent and from 1980 to 1990, the growth rates of the resource and non-resource sectors were both above the international average. Specically, the growth rate of the non-resource sector was 0.1% (it was -1.6% in the rest of the world) and the growth rate of the resource sector was -8% (it was -11.3% in the rest of the world). However, even though the sectors within Gabon outperformed those in the average country, total economic growth in Gabon was nearly half of the international average. Specically, from 1980 to 1990, GDP per capita in Gabon grew -4% while in the rest of the world it grew -2.2%, annually. This is because GDP growth is a weighted average of growth in individual sectors, and in Gabon, a lot of weight (60%) is put on the energy sector, which from 1980 to 1990, experienced a rapid decline in its corresponding price. The key result that should be taken away from preceding analysis is that non-resource sectors do not appear to grow especially slowly in resource-dependent countries. To the contrary, there is some evidence that non-resource sectors expand disproportionately in highly resource-dependent countries when the price of the resource rises, perhaps reecting positive economic spillovers. However, this result is not robust. After dropping potential outliers, the relationships between total growth and resource dependence are maintained, but sectorspecic growth rates are not robustly correlated with resource dependence (for all growth periods). In other words, while resource-dependent and resource-scarce countries grow at dierent rates, the sectors within these two types of countries grow at similar rates.
9 This highlights the role that average sector-growth heterogeneity plays in determining country-wide growth rates. Resource-dependent countries grew slowly from 1980 to 1990 in part because they were dependent on the production of a commodity that experienced a rapid decline in its international price.
As discussed above, there are reasons to think resource booms and busts aect traded and non-traded sectors of the economy dierently. A resource boom may inate the price of nontraded goods (e.g., services) but would not, in theory, increase the price of traded goods (e.g., manufacturing) as those prices are internationally determined. I therefore also examine the relationship between resource dependence and growth in service and manufacturing production 9 Failing to reject the null hypothesis of no eect of course does not imply the null hypothesis should be accepted. It is possible that non-resource-sector growth rates are negatively correlated with resource dependence, but there is too much statistical noise to measure the eect. Nonetheless, for only three of the ten growth periods considered is the relationship between resource dependence and non-resource-sector growth insignicantly negative, for the rest it is either signicantly or insignicantly positive.
specically. As before, data on service and manufacturing value added, expressed as a share of GDP, were collected from the World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank.
Resource dependence is dened as before. Data on manufacturing and service production is inconsistently reported. For example, there are many more missing observations for manufacturing production in 1970 than in 2000. Therefore, sample sizes vary according to the growth period in consideration. This robustness check has the added benet of quelling concerns that the previous ndings are somehow the result of an accounting identity. For example, in the previous analysis, non-resource production is dened as total production (GDP) less resource production. This is not a concern here as levels of manufacturing and service production are reported independently from resource production. Finally, this robustness check utilizes a slightly dierent country set (countries included vary according to data availability). This re-assures that the previous ndings are not specic to a particular set of countries.
The results re-enforce the previous ones and are detailed in Table 4 also from 1970 to 1990.
As a nal robustness check, following Davis (2011) , I estimate the relationship between growth in GDP per capita and resource dependence, conditional on the growth rate of resource production.
12 This is an intuitively pleasing approach as variation in total growth that is attributed to variation in resource-sector growth is captured by growth in resource production.
Any remaining nefarious eect of resource dependence on growth would then be reected by the coecient on resource dependence. The results are given in Table 6 . For all growth periods, the coecient on resource dependence is statistically insignicant. Though, it does enter negatively in all but 2 regressions. This may be evidence of some relatively minor but nonetheless perverse growth eect of resource dependency. As expected, the coecient on resource growth is positive in all regressions, reecting that a booming (busting) resource sector positively (negatively) aects total growth.
Resource Abundance vs. Resource Dependence
The seminal work of Jeery Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) helped to motivate the large stream of research that has attempted to verify and explain the curse of natural resources.
The title of their paper Natural resource abundance and economic growth, is somewhat misleading though as they proxy for resource-abundance (proven reserves of natural resources) with the share of resource exports in GDP (resource dependence), due to data availability constraints. This proxy may be a poor one because (i) resource exports do not reect total resource production and (ii) resource dependence may be a poor proxy for resource abundance.
Is there a negative correlation between resource abundance and economic growth? The answer appears to be, probably not. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) same problem for institutional quality or economic performance as ows of resource rents do. But this begs the question -since resource stocks can be converted into ows of money, why would outcomes for stocks and ows be dierent? This paper oers an explanation for this apparent anomaly. The overall growth rate of an economy reects the growth rate of specic sectors, and the growth rate of the resource sector is dened by the price and ow of a resourcenot the stock.
Conclusion
A large literature documents a robust negative relationship between economic growth and resource dependence (Sachs and Warner, 1995 , 1999 Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007; James and Aadland, 2010) . This surprising result has fueled an even larger literature that seeks to explain it. It is commonly argued that natural-resource dependence creates market and institutional failures that induce slow economic growth (Matsuyama, 1992; Auty, 1994; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason, 2001; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010) .
This paper nds that resource-dependent countries grow slowly during certain growth periods, e.g., 1980 to 1990, but relatively quickly during others (e.g., 1970 to 1980) . These results are largely explained by average sector-growth heterogeneity, a large amount of which is created by variation in the resource price. In essence, resource-rich countries grew slowly from 1980 onward because they were dependent on a commodity that experienced a rapid decline in price. Examining the relationship between resource dependence and sector-specic growth arms this idea. For all growth periods considered, the relationship between resource dependence and growth in non-resource production is non-negative. While these results are certainly suggestive, more work ultimately needs to be done in this area and I hope this paper helps to motivate it.
Finally, the importance of this paper reaches further than the resource curse literature.
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